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court denied the motion, holding that section 360 is not an exclusive
remedy for citizenship claimants. It merely provides an alternative remedy and does not preclude a non resident from obtaining a declaratory
judgment if he avoids the certificate procedure for administrative relief."
This decision, like Tom Mung Ngow v. Dulles,62 is not justified by
legislative history. Section 360 was not designed to provide an alternative remedy for denials of citizenship. It was intended to prevent court
adjudications of citizenship when" the issue arises outside the United
States or in an exclusion proceeding.63 The option afforded by the Cort
case destroys the effectiveness of section 360 because non residents will
not choose the administrative procedure of that provision when a declaratory'judg-ment can be so easily obtained. The Cort decision does settle
constitutional doubts, however, by rendering the discriminatory scheme
of section 360(b) and (c) completely harmless. If that decision is affirmed by the Supreme Court, 4" every claimant of United States citizenship will be entitled to a judicial determination of his claim. Section 360
will have been amended by the judicial process to conform to the recommendation made by the American Bar Association in 1957.5

TAXABILITY OF LIFE INSURANCE PROCEEDS PAID TO STOCKHOLDERS OF CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATIONS
The taxability of insurance proceeds paid upon policies covering
the lives of key persons and stockholders of closely-held corporations
presents an interesting and unique problem f6"r the tax planner. The
choice of similar programs niay lead to vastiy different tax consequences,
and careless planning may subject surviving stockholders to taxation
under the theory of constikuctive dividends. This problem is by no means
new for in 1925 the Commissioner of Internal Revenue ruled that:
Where the proceeds of a life insurance policy are paid to a cor61. "While the plaintiff might have applied for a certificate of identity for the purpose of following the procedure set forth in Section 360, there is nothing in this case
to indicate that he ever did or that such a certificate has been issued to him. Instead
he has chosen to bring this action under the Declaratory judgment Act for a judgment
declaring him to be a United States citizen." Cort v. Herter, 187 F. Supp. 683, 685
(D.D.C, 1960).
(Emphasis added.)
62. 122 F. Supp. 709 (D.D.C. 1954).
63. Legislative history cited notes 46, 47 supra.
64. °This case was argued October 11, 1961 but the decision is still pending. 30

U.SJL. WEEiK 3134 (1961).
657 CJ. text accompanying note 11 npra.

NOTES
poration as beneficiary the fund loses its identity after such
payment, and dividends paid by the corporation to its stockholders out of such fund are taxable in the same manner and to
the same extent as other dividends.'
This ruling seems to have established a firm policy on the part of the
Internal Revenue Service as to the taxation of proceeds of life insurance
policies insuring important members of closely-held corporations,2 for in
1961, the Commissioner stated the position of the Service as being substantially the same:
It is the position of the Service that life insurance proceeds paid
to shareholders of a corporation are taxable as dividends in
cases where the corporation uses its earnings to pay the insurance premiums and has all the incidents of ownership including
the right to name itself beneficiary and, therefore, is not entitled to, and does not in fact, receive the proceeds.'
It is apparent that the latter ruling goes beyond the former in that it
makes the proceeds taxable even though they are paid directly to the
stockholder and not distributed through the corporation. The Comnmissioner undoubtedly has broadened the scope of this policy because of the
multitude of litigation revolving around this subject since the release
of the 1925 ruling.
The latest ruling was released as a result of Ducros v. Commissioner,4 a recent case involving a small closely-held corporation. The corporation president applied for insurance on his own life naming the
corporation as beneficiary and giving the corporation the right to change
beneficiaries. Subsequently, the corporation became vested with all incidents of ownership and changed the beneficiary from the corporation
to the stockholders. The corporation paid all the premiums, and when
the president died the proceeds were paid directly to the stockholderbeneficiaries. It was held that the proceeds were not a distribution by
the corporation and were not taxable as income to the stockholderbeneficiaries.
1. I. T. 2131, IV-1 Cums. BULL. 90 (1925).

2.

HENN, CORPORATIONS, § 257 (1961). "The 'close corporation,' 'closed corporation' or 'closely-held corporation'-or 'one-man corporation,' 'family corporation,' 'incorporated partnership,' or 'chartered partnership,' as it is variously called-is, as its
name implies a corporation whose stock is held by a single shareholder or by a closelyknit group of shareholders. It differs from the public-issue corporation in that there is
no public issue or trading of its voting shares."
3. Rev. Rul. 61-134, 1961 INT. REv. BurrL. No. 29, at 20.

4. 272 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1959).
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The Ducros case was decided in November 1959, by the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, and this precise issue has not been before
a federal court since. However, lest any speculation should arise concerning the possible tax loopholes that the Ducros holding might foster,
the Commissioner made it clear that the Internal Revenue Service will
not follow the decision of the Sixth Circuit in the Ducros case.'
The important question now is whether other courts will follow the
reasoning of the Ducros case or whether they will yield to the position
taken by the Commissioner. In attempting to answer this question, a
brief look at the background against which Ducros was decided will be
helpful. The situation involved so-called "key-man" life insurance."
This is the practice of procuring insurance on the life of an important
official such as the president or principal stockholder of a closely-held or
family corporation, the purpose of which is to compensate the corporation for the loss of the services of the important official. This insurance
is also utilized to fund stock purchase agreements by means of which
control of a closely-held corporation is maintained within a select group.
There are two basic methods by which this latter purpose may be accomplished.' There is the "cross-purchase" agreement whereby each stockholder (or partner in the case of a partnership) takes out insurance on
the lives of the other stockholders (or partners), names himself beneficiary under each policy, and promises to use the proceeds to purchase
the interest of each deceased stockholder. The other method is the
"entity-purchase" plan whereby the corporation or partnership itself takes
out insurance on the life of each stockholder or partner, names itself
beneficiary, and agrees to use the proceeds to purchase the interest of
each deceased stockholder or partner. Either of these two methods may
be used with variations.8
Key-man life insurance has long been used for the purpose of funding stock purchase agreements, and it was expressly recognized as a valid
business transaction in Emeloid Co. v. Commissioner.' The corporation
purchased single premium life insurance policies on the lives of its two
5. Rev. Rul. 61-134, supra note 3.
6. HARNETT, TAXATiON OF LiFE INsuRANcE 6 (1957): "Another common form of
business life insurance is the so-called 'key-man' insurance. Under this practice, companies may insure the lives of employees whose death either at any time or at a specific
time will cause great financial injury to the firm."

7. Note, 71 HAgv. L. Rv. 687, 688 (1958).

8. For example, a trust device may be used whereby the proceeds are made payable

to the trustee who then may distribute the funds to the surviving stockholders or purchase the deceased's stock and hold it for the benefit of the surviving stockholders. See
Golden v. Commissioner, 113 F.2d 590 (3rd Cir. 1940) and Doran v. Commissioner, 246

F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1957).
9. 189 F.2d 230 (3rd Cir. 1951).
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principal stockholder-officers as key men, with the purpose of providing
for the continuity of efficient management by allowing the corporation
to buy the first deceased's interest. The corporation borrowed the money
with which to make the premium payment, and it was held that such
borrowed funds constituted "borrowed invested capital" for excess profits
tax purposes. In so holding the court said:
What corporate purpose could be considered more essential than
key man insurance? The business that insures its buildings
and machinery and automobiles from every possible hazard can
hardly be expected to exercise less care in protecting itself
against the loss of two of its most vital assets-managerial
skill and experience. In fact, the government has not seriously
contended here that key man insurance is not a proper corporate purpose."0
The problem lies in determining whether proceeds paid to the stockholder-beneficiaries are corporate distributions or whether they are insurance proceeds payable by reason of the death of the insured. If the
latter, then of course they are not taxable under provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code." This, then, is the very essence of the controversy between the Ducros holding and the Commissioner's ruling. The Commissioner's contention is that such proceeds are a dividend flowing from the
corporation to the stockholder-beneficiaries, 2 and as such are taxable
within the meaning of § 301 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954."
To be taxable as gross income under § 301, the distribution by the
corporation must come within the meaning of a "dividend" as defined
by § 316 (a) of the Code.' 4 Upon the plain meaning of § 316 (a), it is
10. Id. at 233.
11. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 101 (a) (1) : "General Rule-Except as otherwise
provided in paragraph (2) and in subsection (d), gross income does not include amounts
received (whether in a single sum or otherwise) under a life insurance contract, if such
amounts are paid by reason of the death of the insured."
12. Rev. Rul. 61-134, supra note 3.
13. INT. Rzv. CODEoOF 1954, § 301 (c) (1) : "Amount constituting dividend.-That
portion of the distribution which is a dividend (as defined in section 316) shall be included in gross income."

14. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 316 (a) : "General rule.-For purposes of this subtitle, the term 'dividend' means any distribution of property made by a corporation to its
shareholders-(l) out of its earnings and profits accumulated after February 28, 1913,
or (2) out of its earnings and profits of the taxable year (computed as of the close of
the taxable year without diminution by reason of any distributions made during the taxable year), without regard to the amount of the earnings and profits at the time the
distribution was made. Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, every distribution
is made out of earnings and profits to the extent thereof, and from the most recently
accumulated earnings and profits. To the extent that any distribution is, under any
provision of this subchapter, treated as a distribution of property to which section 301

250
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difficult to see how the Commissioner can consider it to cover insurance
proceeds paid directly to the stockholder. This section defines a dividend as ". . . any distribution of property made by a corporation to its
shareholders . . .out of its earnings and profits .

.

.

."

It is apparent

that payment of life insurance proceeds is not a dividend within the normal concept of the term.1" How then can such payments be taxed as
dividends? The underlying theory is that the payments are economic
gains flowing to the stockholder from the corporation, and that the net
effect is the same as if such payments were ordinary dividends. Apparently the fact that the payments are made directly to the stockholderbeneficiary from the insurance company and not paid to the corporation
and subsequently distributed to the stockholder makes no difference to
the Commissioner.
This distinction, though, was brought out clearly in the Ducros case.
The court, in Ducros, distinguished the case of Cummings v. Commissioner 6 where the corporation insured the life of its president and named
itself as sole beneficiary. The distinguishing feature was that under a
predetermined plan, the proceeds, when paid to the corporation upon the
insured's death, were then redistributed to the surviving stockholders. It
was held that the amounts received by the stockholders were not exempt
from taxation. The court also distinguished Ducros from Golden v. Com7 another case where
missioner,"
exemption was denied. There the corporation was the owner and beneficiary of eleven policies on the life of
its president. It assigned the beneficial interests to a trust company
which collected the proceeds upon the president's death and distributed
them to the stockholders. The distributions were held taxable as "dividends" measured by the amount of the proceeds of the policies. The distinction was based on the corporation's having retained valuable incidents
of ownership in Golden.
The government apparently could see no distinction between Cummings and Ducros since it argued in the latter case that:
The transactions here must be considered as if the corporation
had received the proceeds (which had been purchased by premiums paid out of corporate funds) and then had distributed
them to its shareholders. The short-cut method used by which
the corporation designated beneficiaries who were to receive
applies, such distribution shall be treated as a distribution of property for purposes of
this subsection."

15. See HENN, CORPORATIONS, § 318 (1961) for a good discussion of what constitutes a dividend.
16. 73 F.2d 477 (1st Cir. 1934).
17. 113 F.2d 590 (3rd Cir. 1940).
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directly the proceeds from a policy which it alone owned is of
8
no consequence in determining the taxability of the proceeds.
The court failed to be impressed by this argument, because the corporation was not entitled to receive the proceeds under the provisions of the
policy. The court would not consider the case as if the corporation were
so entitled.
No mention was made in the Ducros case of Doran v. Commissioner,'" although a similar result was obtained. In that case the corporation procured insurance policies on the lives of corporate stockholders.
The corporation was to pay the premiums and the proceeds were to be
paid to trustees who were then to purchase the deceased party's stock and
hold it for the surviving stockholders. Upon receiving the proceeds of
one of the policies, the trustees purchased the stock as planned, and the
court held that the surviving stockholders did not receive a taxable dividend. Although there was a trust arrangement involved in Doran as in
Golden, the two cases were distinguished by the fact that the corporation
in Doran was not named beneficiary of the policies originally and thus
had no interest which could be assigned to the trustees. Therefore, no
incidents of ownership could have been retained by the corporation. Consequently the stockholders were entitled to claim an income tax exemption
for the proceeds of the policy.
If the Commissioner recognizes the ruling in the Doran case as valid,
then certainly an argument for the Ducros decision can be maintained by
analogizing the two. In both cases the corporation paid the premiums,
and in both cases the proceeds were paid to the stockholders rather than
to the corporation. In Ducros, the proceeds were paid directly to the
stockholders while in Doran,the proceeds were paid to a trustee who purchased the deceased's stock for the surviving stockholders. In both,
however, the result was to place surviving stockholders in a position to
acquire the deceased party's stock. It was not the presence of the trust
arrangement in Doran which prevented tax liability, for, as was shown
by the Golden case, the use of a trust for the purpose of distributing the
proceeds is immaterial. There was no liability in Doranbecause the corporation was never a beneficiary and never had an interest that could have
been assigned to the trustee. Of course, in Ducros the corporation was
the original beneficiary, and after subsequently acquiring full ownership
it changed the beneficiaries to the stockholders.
This, then is the reason that the Commissioner fails to recognize
18. Ducros v. Commissioner, 272 F.2d 49, 52 (6th Cir. 1959).
19. 246 F.2d 934 (9th Cir. 1957).
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Ducros-the fact that incidents of ownership were retained by the corporation because it still had the right to change beneficiaries. The court
answered this by stating that although the corporation had the right, it
did not exercise it, and the stockholders actually were the beneficiaries
at the death of the insured. This would seem to render the case analogous to Doran. The Commissioner's position that the proceeds are taxable as dividends where the corporation has ".

.

. all the incidents of

ownership including the right to name itself beneficiary, even though the
Corporation does not name itself beneficiary .
"20 obviously is the
same as the unsuccessful argument offered by the Government in
Ducros.2 ' Although the Commissioner has a method by which to distinguish Ducros from Doran, certainly a valid argument for supporting the
Ducros holding could be maintained along these lines.
When the Ducros decision was announced it appeared that the taxpayers had won a victory in the field of taxability of insurance proceeds
just as they seem to have done in the related field of taxability of insurance premiums.22 Although the Ducros decision dealt only with the taxability of proceeds, closely allied to this issue is that of the taxability of
premiums paid by the corporation on policies covering the lives of its key
men. The overall problem of taxability of insurance premiums is beyond
the scope of this note,2" but in order to focus more clearly upon the problem of taxation of proceeds, a brief look at the status of the law in regard
to taxation of premiums is warranted.
Underlying the discussion up to this point is the concept of double
taxation of corporate profits. Under existing tax laws, profits earned by
a corporation in its normal course of operations are taxed as income to
the corporation. These same profits, when subsequently distributed to
the stockholders as dividends, are again taxed as income to the stockholders. Hence, there now exists a standard of double taxation. When
a corporation pays the premiums on a life insurance policy and a stockholder collects the proceeds, it would seem that at some point of time the
stockholder has received income from the corporation. If Ducros were
followed, however, there would be no income taxable to the stockholder
20. Rev. Rul. 61-134, supra note 3.
21. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
22. Rev. Rul. 59-184, 1959-1 Cums. BULL. 65 (1959): "Where a corporation purchases life insurance on the lives of its stockholders, the proceeds of which are to be
used in payment for the stock of stockholder, the premiums on such insurance do not
constitute income to the stockholder, even though the stockholder has the right to designate a beneficiary, provided such right of the beneficiary to receive the proceeds is conditioned upon the transfer of the corporate stock to the corporation."
23. For more extensive treatment of this topic, see generally Note, The Use of Life
Insurance to Fund Agreements Providing for Disposition of a Business Interest at Death,

71 HARV. L. REv. 687 (1958) ; Annot., 73 A.L.R. 2d 708 (1960).

NOTES
when the proceeds were received; and, according to a recent line of cases,
neither would there be income taxable to the stockholder when the corporation paid the premiums. In Casale v. Commissioner24 the corporation insured the.life of its president and chief stockholder for the purpose of funding a deferred income plan for him, naming itself beneficiary
and retaining the rights to assign the policy. The premium paid by the
corporation was held not to be a distribution of a taxable dividend by the
corporation to the president. In Prunierv. Commissioner2 5 a closely-held
family corporation paid the premiums on the insurance covering the lives
of the two principal stockholders upon the understanding that the proceeds would go to the corporation to be used to buy the stock of the deceased stockholder. Again it was held that such premium payments by
the corporation did not constitute taxable income to the stockholder.
Under circumstances similar to those in Casale and Prunier,a like result
was obtained in Sanders v. Fox.26 Thus, if neither the premiums paid by
the corporation nor the proceeds when paid to the stockholder are taxed,
then not only is there no double tax, there is no tax at all levied upon
these sums. This runs counter to the whole scheme of double taxation.
The Commissioner has acquiesced in the decisions discussed above
and has declared that they will be followed by the Internal Revenue
Service."
The problem as presented above, however, was stated rather broadly,
because premium payments are not automatically tax exempt to the stockholder. As the cases seem to bear out, the taxability problem centers
around whether the corporation or the stockholder will receive the proceeds. In Casale and Prunierthe corporation in each case was the beneficiary of the policies upon which it paid the premiums. In Yuengling v.
8
Commissioner,
where the taxpayer owned all the capital stock in a corporation and the corporation paid the premiums on policies on the taxpayer's life with the proceeds payable to his wife and children, the payment of the premiums was held to be a benefit to the taxpayer and
24. 247 F.2d 440 (2nd Cir. 1957).
25. 248 F.2d 818 (1st Cir. 1957).
26. 253 F.2d 855 (10th Cir. 1958). Stockholders in a closely-held corporation entered into an agreement with the corporation where, under a plan funded by insurance
covering the lives of the stockholders, the corporation was to redeem their stock. The
corporation paid the premiums and the premium payments were not taxable to the stockholders as "constructive dividends."
27. Rev. Rul. 59-184, supra note 22: "The decisions of the U. S. Courts of Appeals
in the cases of Oreste Casale v. Commissioner, 247 Fed. 2d 440; Henry E. Prunier v.
Commissioner, 248 Fed. 2d 818; and Robert V. Sanders v. Charles I. Fox, 253 Fed. 2d
855; involving similar factual situations, will be followed by the Internal Revenue Service."
28. 69 F.2d 971 (3rd Cir. 1934).
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properly taxable as income to him. Again, in Paramount-RichardsTheatres v. Commissioner,9 the premium payments were held taxable as income to the stockholder. The corporation here was a holding company
whose stock was held jointly by another corporation and an individual.
The corporate stockholder caused the holding company to procure an
insurance policy on the life of the individual stockholder. The holding
company paid the premiums and the proceeds were to be used to adjust
the purchase price of the deceased individual's stock between the corporate stockholders if they exercised certain options to buy. The court
said that the stockholders had used corporate funds for their own benefit
in paying the premiums and the premium payments were not ordinary
business expenses of the holding company. Accordingly, the premium
payments were held to be taxable income to the stockholders. It would
appear, then, that whether or not premium payments by the corporation
are taxable to the stockholder depends upon whether the corporation or
the stockholder receives the proceeds--i.e., if the stockholder receives the
proceeds he must pay tax on the premiums.
Whether the corporation or the stockholders will receive the proceeds
will usually depend upon which type of buy-sell arrangement is to be used.
If the cross-purchase agreement is used, the proceeds traditionally are
paid directly to the surviving stockholders to be used by them in purchasing the deceased's interest. If the entity-purchase agreement is used, the
proceeds are paid to the corporation which in turn purchases the deceased's outstanding stock. This is known as stock redemption"0 and is
not taxable under the Internal Revenue Code of 1954.3
The problem encountered here, though, is whether the remaining
stockholders have received an economic benefit or "constructive dividend" upon the redem1tion of the stock by the corporation from the deceased stockholder. For example, assume a situation where each of two
persons owns 50% of the outstanding stock in a corporation, and the
corporation buys all the stock of one. The remaining stockholder would
then own 100% of the outstanding corporate sto ck. Has he received the
equivalent of a corporate dividend? No, according t6 the recent case of
29. 153 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1946).
30. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 317 (b) : "Redemption of stock.-For purpose of this
part, the term 'property' means money, securities, and any other property; except that
such term does not include stock in the corporation making the distribution (or rights to
acquire such stock)."
31. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,

§ 302 (a) :-If a corporation redeems its stock (within the meaning of section 317 (b)), and if paragraph (1), (2), (3), or (4) of subsection
(b) applies, such redemption shall be treated as a distribution in part or full payment in
exchange for the stock."
;I ,

NOTES
2
There the payment by the corporation for the
Holsey v. Commissioner.1
purchase of 50% of the outstanding stock by the corporation was held
not to be the same as a distribution of a taxable dividend to the remaining stockholder.
It cannot be doubted that the remaining stockholder has achieved
some benefit. He has sole managerial authority, and he alone will benefit from any future increases of the market value of the stock. He has
not benefited financially, however, on the immediate transaction. For
instance, if the corporation has net assets (total assets minus total liabilities) of $400,000, each of the stockholders would have an interest of
$200,000. If the corporation bought the stock of one stockholder, it
would pay him $200,000 for it, thus reducing the net assets (or net worth)
to $200,000, which would represent the interest of the remaining stockholder. He now owns 100% of a corporation worth $200,000, whereas
before he owned 50% of a corporation worth $400,000. Thus, he has
realized no immediate monetary gain. Under this reasoning, the Holsey
case seems to be sound law. In any event, the Commissioner has decided
to recognize the decision as a valid precedent."3 Thus, this enhancement
in value of the remaining outstanding stock is not a "constructive dividend" for income tax purposes.
Simply stated, Holsey can be said to hold that there is no tax imposed under the redemption arrangement. Cross-purchase agreements,
however, apparently are subject to taxation. In Wall v. United States, 4
the taxpayer owned 50% of the corporate stock and the other 50% was
owned by a person who was also the principal owner of the corporation's
chief competitor. Desiring to get his competitor out of the corporation,
the taxpayer entered into an agreement with him whereby the taxpayer
was to buy the competitor's 50% interest for a cash payment plus a balance payable over ten years. About a year and half later, the taxpayer
transferred the purchased shares to the corporation, which agreed to assume the payments to the competitor. It was held that these payments
by the corporation to the competitor were taxable as income to the taxpayer. Holsey was distinguished from Wall in that in Holsey there was
no obligation to buy imposed upon the remaining stockholder. The Wall

32. 258 F.2d 865 (3rd Cir. 1958) ; See also Ward v. Rountree, 193 F. Supp. 154
(M. D. Tenn. 1961).
33. Rev. Rul. 58-614, 1958-2 Cum. BULL. 920 (1958): "The Internal Revenue Service will follow the decision of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, rendered
Sept. 3, 1958, in the case of Joseph R. Holsey v. Commissioner, in cases involving similar facts and circumstances. The decision holds that a remaining shareholder of a corporation does not receive a constructive dividend by way of enhancement in the value of
his stock as a result of a purchase by the corporation of another shareholder's stock."
34. 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947).
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case brought out the distinction between redemption agreements and
cross-purchase agreements, although it was a seemingly artificial one.
The court relied chiefly upon form rather than substance in reaching its
decision. It was the contention of the taxpayer that:
. . . the two transactions, that is, the transfer from Coleman
[competitor] to Wall [taxpayer] in 1937 and the transfer from
Wall to Rosedale [corporation] in 1939, should be treated as
parts of a single transaction whereby Coleman sold his stock to
Rosedale without the intervention of Wall. This, it is said, is
the true meaning of what the parties did and hence Wall incurred no tax liability; and we are asked to reach this conclusion since taxation is a practical matter which requires that regard be had to the substance rather than to the form of the
taxpayer's acts."
The court refused to consider the two transactions as constituting a single
transaction, saying:
Wall deliberately elected to attain his objective by two distinct
transactions and there is no evidence that he was merely acting
as an agent for Rosedale when he made the purchase. As was
stated in Woodruff v. Commissioner, 5 Cir., 131 F. 2d 429,
430, where a similar contention was advanced and rejected,
"if a taxpayer has two legal methods by which he may attain a
desired result, the method pursued is determinative for tax
purposes without regard to the fact that different tax results
would have attached if the alternative procedure had been followed." 8
If the court had followed the taxpayer's contention, the result would have
been a case of stock redemption, and hence, no tax liability. But in construing the two transactions as being separate and distinct, it was simply
a matter of the corporation paying the debt of a stockholder, which debt
had been incurred in a cross-purchase agreement between two equal
stockholders.
The cross-purchase agreement in Wall was unfunded, which distinguishes the case from Ducros, where the cross-purchase agreement was
funded with life insurance; but this factual distinction ought not preclude a comparison of the two. It may be argued that because of the
formal distinction employed in Wall that the case is not direct authority
35. Id. at 465.
36. Id. at 466.
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for permitting taxation in cross-purchase agreements. If form was important in Wall, then form and not merely substance was properly given
consideration in Ducros. Thus the result in Ducros might justifiably
make the tax consequences of cross-purchase agreements more desirable.
It has been shown by the Holsey case that the advantages gained by
the remaining stockholders in stock redemption cases are not "constructive dividends" for tax purposes. Just what is a "constructive dividend,"
then?" The Tax Court has generally held that a stockholder has received a constructive dividend if an "economic benefit" can be found.38
Apparently, then, "constructive dividend" and "economic benefit" are
synonomous. This, however, is not necessarily true. Suppose a corporation purchases a life insurance policy on its president with itself as beneficiary and, upon the insured president's death, collects and retains the
proceeds within the corporation. The corporation is not taxed upon the
receipt of the proceeds. 3" If it does not distribute the proceeds to the
stockholders, then no one is taxed. But have not the stockholders received an economic gain through the increase in the value of their shares?
They own the same proportionate share of a now wealthier entity. This
is not a "constructive dividend" insofar as income taxes are concerned,
though, for:
In a loose manner of speaking, it can be said that any corporate
gain is a benefit, indirectly, to the stockholders, so that if a corporation becomes the beneficial owner of insurance policies, the
stockholders receive the benefit thereof. Of course this argument proves too much, for it would lead to the conclusion that
profits made by a corporation in its business are automatically
taxable income to the stockholders. This is contrary to the
40
taxation scheme of the Internal Revenue Code.
The economic benefit theory thus does not seem to be a completely satisfactory means of determining taxable income.
Apparently there is no rigid definition to be applied to the term
"constructive dividend." It affords the courts a convenient tool to use
in settling a particular tax dispute but would probably lose its utility if
37. For an excellent discussion of this topic see Brafford, The Constructive Receipt of Dividends, 47 KY. L.J. 378 (1959).
38. Id. at 389.
39. United States v. Supplee-Biddle Hardware Co., 265 U.S. 189 (1924). It was
held that as to receipt of proceeds of life insurance policies paid upon the death of the
insured, there is no distinction between an individual beneficiary and a corporate beneficiary for income tax purposes. Thus, a corporate beneficiary is entitled to an exemption of such proceeds just as an individual is entitled to such exemption.
40. Prunier v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 818, 821 (1st Cir. 1947).
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reduced to concrete form. Although the term is not capable of precise
definition in itself, the courts have produced some guidelines for use
in determining whether there has or has not been a constructive dividend
granted by a corporation. It has consistently been stated that substance
and not form is controlling in determining tax consequences." Likewise,
there does not have to be a formal declaration of a dividend in order for
there to be a constructive dividend.2 Nor does the income have to be
actually received to constitute a constructive dividend.43
A constructive dividend may result by corporate income being diverted to controlling stockholders, 4 by cancellation by a corporation of
a debt due from a stockholder45 or even by the payment of a fine by the
corporation for a stockholder.4" The idea of constructive dividends,
therefore, is one capable of wide application.
Although the term "constructive dividend" is used liberally by
courts in tax cases, it does not appear in the Commissioner's ruling on
the Ducros case. The term employed by the Commissioner is "taxable
dividend."47 This difference in terminology is of slight consequence, for
if read in context the term "taxable dividend" implies "taxable constructive dividend."
CONCLUSION

Since the Ducros decision was not appealed to the Supreme Court,
the issues involved are not yet settled, and other courts may conclude that
the issues should be resolved another way. Undoubtedly the Commissioner's ruling will have some influence upon courts which must decide
the issue, but it is submitted that the ruling should not be controlling. As
has been pointed out, there are forceful arguments that can be advanced
41.

See, e.g., Helvering v. Gordon, 87 F.2d 663 (8th Cir. 1937) ; Dawkins v. Com-

missioner, 238 F.2d 174, 176 (8th Cir. 1956); Erickson v. United States, 189 F. Supp.
521 (S.D. I1. 1960).
42. Simon v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 869, 875 (8th Cir. 1957); Hash v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 248, 250 (4th Cir. 1959); Sachs v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 879, 882
(8th Cir. 1960) ; Jaeger Motor Car Co. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 127 (7th Cir. 1960).
43. Clark v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 698, 713 (9th Cir. 1959).
44. Dawkins v. Commissioner, 238 F.2d 174, 178 (8th Cir. 1956); Simon v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 869, 873 (8th Cir. 1957).
45. Hash v. Commissioner, 273 F.2d 248 (4th Cir. 1959). The president-stockholder's personal account was credited, reducing the balance of the account (which represented president's indebtedness to the corporation). This credit was the amount found
taxable by the Commissioner who held that it was a "dividend" to the president.
46. Sachs v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 879 (8th Cir. 1960). The president of the
corporation was fined pursuant to a conviction of unlawfully attempting to evade part of
the income tax owed by the corporation. The voluntary payment of his fine by the corporation was held to be, in effect, a payment of dividends and the payment was part of
his gross income for tax purposes.
47. Rev. Rul. 61-134, supra note 3.

NOTES
in favor of Ducros; and it should be remembered that the existence of
Ducros abolishes the artificial, but crucial, tax distinctions between crosspurchase and stock redemption plans. The most important lesson to be
learned from the foregoing is that great care must be exercised when life
insurance is utilized to fund stock purchase agreements in order that
adverse tax consequences may be avoided. The tax planner who determines to use the Ducros rationale may be charting a course which leads
to litigation and possibly additional tax liability. Where a Ducros situation is involved, caution should be the keynote, as it is very difficult to
predict the final determination of the issue.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY ACTIONS
IN INDIANA
Traditionally, the right of appeal from decisions of administrative
officials, boards or agencies is a matter of legislative discretion to be
given or withheld as the legislature sees fit; there is no vested right of
appeal. 1 The legislature may not only declare what questions may be
tried or reviewed on appeal, to what tribunal the appeal may proceed and
where the appeal shall stop, but it also may deny any appeal whatsoever.2
Therefore, if no statutory procedure is provided, no review is available, 3
unless the extraordinary prerogative writs4 are applicable. The use of
the extraordinary writs as a method of review is highly complicated and
often unsatisfactory.' They are incomplete and overlapping, and taken
1. Ruddick v. City of Columbus, 183 Ind. 21, 108 N.E. 106 (1915) (proceeding
through common council to extend or open certain streets) ; Collins v. Laybold, 182 Ind.
126, 104 N.E. 971 (1914) (drainage proceedings); Bemis v. Guirl Drainage Co., 182
Ind. 36, 105 N.E. 496 (1914); Stockton v. Yeoman, 179 Ind. 61, 100 N.E. 2 (1913)
(public highway improvement proceedings).
2. Bemis v. Guirl Drainage Co., supra note 1.
3. In re Petition to Transfer Appeals, 202 Ind. 365, 174 N.E. 812 (1931); State
Board v. Ort, 84 Ind. App. 260, 151 N.E. 31 (1925) ; Cushman v. Hussey, 187 Ind. 228,
118 N.E. 816 (1917) ; Farley v. Hamilton Co., 126 Ind. 468, 26 N.E. 174 (1890) ; Sims
v. Monroe Co., 39 Ind. 40 (1872).
4. Mandamus: IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-2201-8808, (Bums 1946); Prohibition:
IND. ANN. STAT. §3-2006-2007 (Burns 1946) ; Quo Warranto (Information) : IND. ANN.
STAT. § 3-2001-2004 (Burns 1946); Injunction: IND. ANN. STAT. § 3-2101-2120
(Burns 1946). Reference to the extraordinary writs is made at this point for background purposes only. For a complete historical background of the use of the various
writs and a thorough discussion of their use and function in the field of judicial review,
see Note, Appellate Review by Extraordinary Writ in Indiana, 33 IND. L. J.431 (1958).
See also, Fuchs, Judicial Control of Administrative Agencies in Indiana, I, 28 IND. L. J.
1, 17-27 (1952).
5. The use of extraordinary remedies as a means of judicial review has not escaped
criticism. See DAvis, ADI NiSTRATrE LAW § 24.01 (1958): "An imaginary system

